“Writings on Syrian walls” is the blog Rima Marrouch is writing for the platform “The Arab world in Revolution(s)” since March 2012. Interview with the young Polish-Syrian woman based in Lebanon today about her motivations and inspirations for her writing.

“My name is Rima Marouch. I am 29 years old. I am a journalist. I’m a weird mixture which is I am Syrian but also Polish. I hold dual citizenship. Identity is a weird creature. Sometimes you feel more Syrian; sometimes you feel more Polish, sometimes Polish-Syrian and sometimes you just feel like yourself.”

ARTE: You have got a prize for your blog on ARTE’s platform “The Arab world in Revolution(s)”. How do you feel about that?

Rima Marrouch: The Anna-Lindh price came in a moment of doubt. When you ask yourself all these existential questions: Who am I? What do I do, and where do you go? It was great to see that people read what you do and there is recognition. It was a good feeling.

Rima Marrouch (4th from the right) standing next to the other winners and jury members. Photo: Bernhard Ludewig.

ARTE: When and why did you start blogging?

I first started blogging more than a year ago. I remember the first blog. It was for the LA times, the newspaper I work for. I came to the LA Times office in Beirut and it was the day when Syrian forces were shelling Latakia. And my college said: “Why don’t you report on that?” So I sat down. I managed to contact people on the ground and I wrote. I think the question “Why do you blog?” is a wider question “Why do you write?” I think probably everyone has a different reason. I think mine is connected to my father who always tried to convince us if you are upset or happy write. Although he is doctor he published two books of short stories. In general he taught us there are several ways to get things out of your system. It is either running, swimming or writing.

ARTE: Concerning liberty of expression in Syria, what has changed since the  revolution?

Regarding liberty of expression after the Arab spring I see how many things have changed. I see how my generation in the Arab world is different from the generation of my father. We are more transparent, we are more direct. We like to break social taboos or social norms. There is still a long way. Arab spring was like this huge explosion where people finally realized: “We have a voice!” I think we still need to learn how to express our opinion in a way that will be constructive and not harmful sometimes. We are definitely better off than previous generations in that regard.

ARTE: What influence did the new media have on that development? What are the risks of social media’s transparency?

Syrians are addicted to Facebook. This is often how we gather information or news. Especially in this revolution I am amazed by how activists use the tools, the social media, Youtube. There is nothing hidden anymore. Of course there are things hidden but it is more difficult to hide things and keep information for yourself. At the beginning people were more careful; sometimes they would only use their first name, sometimes they would just use a nickname or an activist name. And now people are coming out because they believe we are on this stage where things are clear and open. We are in a stage of war if we like it or not. So I think people came to the conclusion that people are dying and the country is going into a direction that no one is sure about. It’s not time to keep secrets anymore or to hide your identity. And there are still people who are doing great, who are still hiding, who the regime was not able to locate. They are standing still inside and doing great work. It is probably a fine balance that everyone decides about himself.

Rima Marrouch at the awards in Berlin on the 18th of October, with the German journalist Astrid Frohloff. Photo: Bernhard Ludewig.

ARTE: Currently, you are based in Beirut. Why did you choose to live in Lebanon?

My situation is a bit different from other many young people who were forced to flee. I was already living outside Syria, I would just come and visit often. I got a job offer that was based in Beirut. This is how I came and love that it is in Beirut because it is close to Syria. That was before the revolution, because as a journalist it was very difficult to work in Syria. Beirut seems to be a natural choice for many journalists.

ARTE: Do you try to go back to Syria sometimes?

I went in several times. It‘s not as difficult as it used to be. And there is nothing heroic about it. The rebels are controlling three crossings, one of them you can enter very easily. The Turkish authorities stamp you out. There is a passport controlling on the Syrian side, they take your name and stamp you in. It is still risky inside. I think the worst thing is the randomness of shelling. You cannot really protect yourself from military aircraft or artillery fires. But it is not as difficult as it was a few months ago.

ARTE: What is the biggest problem the Syrian people, still living inside, is facing at that moment?

The most difficult thing people are facing right now in Syria are military aircraft, artillery fire and sniper fire because there is a total lack of stability. Thousands of people left their homes. When I was crossing on the Turkish-Syrian border a week ago, there was a place where approximately 3000 people were squatting under olive trees. They used blankets and sheets to get just a bit of shade, because the sun was cruel. But now the winter is coming, so rain and cold. It is just the idea of leaving your home and becoming a refugee, and the numbers are growing. The UN predicted by the end of the year there may be 700.000 Syrian refugees. A week ago one of the Syrian ministers called for the Syrians to return home. And I was just asking myself: Which home he is speaking about? Because there are many families who lost them. The destruction of the infrastructure and the houses left many without homes.

Rima Marrouch and Andreu Claret, executive director of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Photo : Bernhard Ludewig.

ARTE: What do you think about political interferences in Syria? What would be the best support and help for the people there?

First, sometimes I think that I wish Syrians were left on their own, that neither Russia, Iran, Gulf countries, nor Western countries interfered. But it’s a bit naive because the game is out of Syrian hands. I see a vacuum. Honestly, on the ground I don’t see as much western aid or support. I see Doctors without Borders trying to manage unmanageable situations. But I see a lot of help from Kuwait, from the Gulf. And unfortunately, if you are providing help you have a say; or maybe fortunately. It is really easy to win the people’s minds and hearts by very simple steps. For example, Syrian doctors don’t have experience with the trauma medicine and war injuries. I see a lot of young people with amputated legs. I talked to the doctors and they told me often they could be saved but there is just not enough experience and knowledge. I am a bit concerned by the lack of support and I am concerned that people are feeling they are left on their own. There are many Western countries have experience in managing aid distribution that probably could help.

Rima Marrouch with Astrid Frohloff and Andreu Claret, executive director of the Anna Lindh Foundation. Photo: Deutsche Welle

ARTE: What are the next projects you are going to work on?

I am still working for a newspaper and a radio. I am really happy when I write in Arabic and Polish. I think you reach a different audience. I have been publishing in a Syrian weekly, Souriatna, which means “our Syria”. Writing what I see. I probably continue to do that.

Interview by Sabine Lange and Tanja Goldbecher

© First Photo: Everyday Rebellion, a cross-media project on nonviolent struggle all over the world; Supported by ARTE

The Anna Lindh Mediterranean Journalist Award 2012 – 6th edition of the Mediterranean Journalist Award
on the 18th of October from 19h to 21:30h
followed by a reception at the Allianz Cultural foundation’s headquarter (Allianz SE, Pariser Platz 6, D-10117 Berlin)

The  Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures in cooperation with Allianz Cultural Foundation, Goethe-Institut, Centre for Cultural and General Studie s- ZAK, the Anna Lindh German Network and with the media partnership of DW and COPEAM, is organising the 6th edition of the Mediterranean Journalist Award in Berlin, Germany.

The Mediterranean Journalist Award is a leading regional Award aims at rewarding exceptional journalistic productions, contributing to a better understanding of the diversity of cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean region as well as promoting the positive role played by journalists in providing balanced and informed coverage of cultural issues in the region.
Headed by the French philosopher Edgar Morin and gathering renowned media experts and intellectuals, the International Jury of the award had the hard task to choose 5 winners out of the 403 applications we have received this year for the categories of print press, television, radio and new media, addition, to a special category which will be attributed to the best journalistic work on the theme ‘’the role of citizens and civil society in building democracies and pluralistic societies’’.

This year, Nawal el Saadawi has been invited to the first World Forum for Democracy in Strasbourg and Annette Gerlach and Evelyne Herber interviewed her on October 11th. At the age of 82 Nawal el Saadawi has an incisive and critical view on the recent developments in her home country.

ARTE Journal: The Egyptian Revolution has started one and a half years ago. Is Egypt now on its way to develop a democratic political system?  

 ARTE Journal: What has changed since the beginning of the Revolution?

ARTE Journal: What is the position of women in the Egyptian society?

ARTE Journal: How is it possible to evolve the people’s mentality?

ARTE Journal: There has been some rumour that you are nominated for the Nobel Prize in Literature.

Evelyne Herber – Annette Gerlach for ARTE Journal

Photo: Marie Thiery
Photo above: Council of Europe et

Fanny Lépine for ARTE Journal: The Arab League has offered Bashar al-Assad a “safe exit” if he leaves power. Will this influence the Syrian leader?

Didier Billion: “No, I don’t think so because for several months now, a year almost, the Arab League, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has threatened, pressured and made promises to Bashar al-Assad if he either introduces democratic reforms, or – in this new turn of events – leaves the country. The Syrian government has systematically refused and disregarded the proposals put forward by the Arab League. So I don’t think that now the Arab League is in a position to exert any influence over the Syrian government. If any external power can exert real, effective and positive influence it is probably only Russia, or to a certain extent, Kofi Annan. But I don’t believe the Arab League is in a position to influence Bashar al-Assad’s departure.”

What is the intrinsic weakness of the Arab League?

Didier Billion: “If you look at it from a global point of view, it is quite paradoxical, shocking even – if we can be allowed humour in such a situation – that countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia are giving lessons in democracy to Syria, which deserves true democracy, but it’s paradoxical because we know very well that neither Qatar nor Saudi Arabia are paragons of democratic virtue. So it is quite comical to see these countries lecturing others. That’s the first thing. Secondly, and we must not underestimate this, the Arab League is always presented as a homogenous entity, which isn’t the case. On the matter of Syria, since this is the subject of the interview, there are divergences. We know that countries such as Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, are not at the forefront of criticism against Syria and that even if, as we mentioned previously, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are exerting huge pressure on the Syrian government, it isn’t the case for the other countries. From this point of view, the lack of unity is damaging the effectiveness of the Arab League’s threats. That’s a fact. We are not in a position to lecture. The European Union is not excelling either in its management of the Syrian crisis, but in any case, the Arab League is not in a position to really influence the course of events in Syria.”

The Syrian government has on several occasions accused the Arab League of being in the pay of the West. Is that true?

Didier Billion: “It’s just rhetoric. You can’t say that the League, as such, is in the pay of the West, since the Arab League is very divided. Certain countries, I won’t say they are in the pay, but they are very close to the Western powers. I come back to the examples of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, we know they are close allies of the United States in particular. To be specific, they are hand in glove with the United States and some other Western powers over Syria. On the other hand, within the Arab League you have countries that are not only not in the pay of the Western powers but who are opposed to them or in disagreement. Again you can use the example of Iraq, Algeria and others. So the expression ‘in the pay of’ isn’t appropriate.”

Before the start of the Syrian crisis, what relationship did the Assads have with the Arab League?

Didier Billion: “Relations have always been quite tense because the Syrian government, without going too far back in history, has always considered that the Arab League was not active enough regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Obviously this is an extremely sensitive subject for the Syrian government: it always has been. Not because the government is more pro-Palestinian than other Arab countries, but because part of Syria is occupied, annexed by Israel. There has always been this dispute. The Syrian government has always suspected – accused even – members of the Arab League of being too conciliatory with Israel, and the United States: this is very important. So relations have never been good and lately, you can imagine that the Syrian government is not in a position to have normal relations with the Arab League since the pressures are such that they have become the enemy.”

So from the start, the Arab League was in a weak negotiating position?

Didier Billion: “Until now the Arab League’s role has been to rubber stamp decisions. It has not influenced, at any level, any issues in the region. A region that has been troubled for decades. We must not mythicize the Arab League – or its effectiveness, more precisely. But with the Syrian crisis we can see an evolution. For once, the Arab League – or at least the majority of its members – wanted to influence the course of things: it made a number of resolutions, declarations, sanctions regarding Syria and it’s the first time in the history of the Arab League that they have tackled an issue, with the divisions and restrictions I mentioned previously. You can’t say it started from a position of weakness. Traditionally, it’s an organisation, on this issue as on several others, which has survived the major issues in the middle East over the last few decades: the Arab League is about rubber stamping as I said, a body that produces words but little action. There has been a change but not one that will suit the Syrian government, to say the least!”

Fanny Lépine/ARTE Journal

MORE LINKS

Read also the article of the Guardian Assad regime cannot last long, says Arab League leader

 Patrick Schulze-Heil for ARTE Journal: What role does Qatar currently want to play in the Arab world?

Dr. Guido Steinberg: “Qatar would appear to want to play a leading role.  That isn’t necessarily the view of everyone in the country, but it is the view of the current Emir  Hamad bin Khalifa and his Prime Minister. This desire is dividing the country’s political elite, in so far as there is a strong tendency, at the heart of the dynasty, who are banking on a strong alliance with Saudi Arabia,  and subordination. But this tendency is currently less significant than the other. Consequently, Qatar has, in some ways, tried to get the better of Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the country is taking advantage of the weaknesses of the other leading powers. Egypt is completely out of the game, and we don’t know when it will again be in a position to play a role in regional politics.  Saudi Arabia is there, but it is weakened because the political elite is too attached to consensus, aging and quite simply incapable of action much of the time.  In this context, Qatar  has proven its hegemony: with lots of money  and its resolute support for the Islamists, it has achieved a sort of leadership role. But the country may not enjoy this role long term. It is simply too small. And that limits its possibilities. As soon as one of the larger  countries reasserts itself with a more dynamic foreign policy, Qatar will probably disappear from the landscape.”

Qatar very quickly gave its support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia. The success of the Islamist  Ennahda party shows that it already benefited from significant external support under Ben Ali,  what is your view?

Dr. Guido Steinberg: “To many observers, the success of Ennahda, that is the Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood, was a big surprise, because they didn’t know the organisation existed in the country. With hindsight, that wasn’t the case. Their electoral success, with over 40% of the votes, would not have been possible if the structures weren’t in place. But the  Islamists obviously  also exploited the deep religious feelings amongst the people,  something that western politicians failed to spot in Tunisia. When all’s said and done, 80 % of the population speak Arabic as their mother tongue and not French like the elite. These people are practising Muslims, they go to the mosque,  and  Ennahda quickly got control over what was said in the mosques. That’s the explanation for their success. And we must start from the principle that Tunisia is just one country among many. And since Tunisia was a secularised state, it shows to what extent the Muslim Brotherhood could become powerful in countries where secularisation is less established.”

 Today, we see a strengthening of Islamist forces in North Africa and the Near East. 33 years after the Islamic revolution in Iran, is this the beginning of a new Sunni Islamic revolution? Can we compare the two phenomena?

Dr. Guido Steinberg : “The comparison with the Islamic revolution  isn’t far-fetched. When you are unable to act, you have to wait and see how the situation evolves. If the Islamists become as powerful  as after the Islamic revolution in Iran, that is nothing to fear; at least not in the important countries in the region. However, we must expect life to change. It will be more religious. Globally, the values of the Muslim Brotherhood will play a more important role than before, as will the values of large section of the population who support a conservative Islam. And in certain countries, this influence will appear strong enough to worry us.”

 By supporting Sunni  forces in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and  Syria,  Qatar is deliberately acting as a counterbalance to Shiite-dominated Iran and Iraq. Is the hardening of religious conflict between Sunni and Shiites also a result of the Arab spring?

Dr. Guido Steinberg : “The hardening of the Sunni-Shiite conflict is a collateral  result of the events of the past year. In reality, this religious conflict  has been worsening since the American invasion of Iraq, in 2003. Due to its role in the power conflicts between principally  Saudi Arabia  and Iran, it has become a key aspect of regional politics. And when you look at the fault lines, the places where Shiites and Sunnis live together, you see that the events of the Arab spring are perceived against this background of religious conflict.”

MORE LINKS

Read also the analysis : Qatar: an economic and religious offensive

What sets Bahrain apart from other countries in the Gulf?
Claire Beaugrand: It’s the smallest of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and also the poorest. The first oil discovery in the Peninsula was made in Bahrain, in 1932. From 1946, it was also the centre of political power in the Persian Gulf and the home of British colonial rule in the region following its departure from Bushehr in Iran. Today, the island’s oil reserves are practically exhausted, and the refinery processes oil from Saudi Arabia, a country with which Bahrain shares the revenue from the offshore Abu Safa field. Bahrain is therefore economically fragile. In Kuwait, for example, the constitution guarantees a job for its citizens, which Bahrain cannot possibly do.

Like Kuwait, it is more advanced politically than its neighbours. Following the adoption of a constitution in 1973, Bahrain experimented with a parliamentary system which ended in 1975, when the parliament was dissolved. The return to the 1973 constitution, which established a unicameral system, has been the basis of political claims since the early 2000s.

The new Constitution of 2002 provided for an appointed upper house. Many Bahrainis were disappointed by what they saw as a step backwards compared to the achievements of 1973. The division of powers between executive and legislature remains a major stumbling block in the current conflict.

To explain the current crisis, much is also made of the conflict between the Shiite majority and Sunni minority in power.
Claire Beaugrand: Indeed, the religious element is often emphasized in a somewhat simplistic way, but it is not the only element to consider. It combines with socio-economic inequalities which are seen as the result of discriminatory policies. The outlying Shiite villages have developed a strong resentment towards the authorities, because they feel discriminated against in terms of access to housing and employment, particularly in the public sector and government departments and sensitive or strategic institutions such as  Foreign Affairs, the Interior and Defence.

Is this the case?
Claire Beaugrand: Although some people say that there are Shiites in the army and the police, we must recognize that it is rather the exception than the rule and it is certainly not the bulk of troops who come from Pakistan, Yemen and Syria. Shiites see this as evidence of suspicion directed against them, particularly since the Iranian revolution. That said, the army has always been trained by foreigners from Britain or Jordan.

What are the opposition’s demands?
Claire Beaugrand: The opposition is split between those who accept the monarchy and a minority that denies its legitimacy.
The main opposition party is the Wifaq, a Shiite Islamic party, which tends not to over-emphasize its religious identity, and is in alliance with leftist parties. The coalition wants constitutional reforms: in favour of unicameralism, it demands an elected prime minister, that is to say from the parliamentary majority, and one accountable to Parliament. Alongside this, there have emerged more radical movements from Shiite political Islam as it emerged in Iraq in the 1960s and during the Iranian revolution.

The split between moderates and radicals occurred in 2005-2006, when the reformist opposition Wifaq agreed to participate in the 2006 parliamentary elections, breaking the boycott strategy adopted until then and advocated by those opposed to any compromise, which they saw as collaboration with the regime. The radical opposition movements of Haq and Wafa adopted a strategy of civil disobedience, organizing demonstrations in villages which often turned to violent confrontation with police, leading to the familiar cycle of demonstration-arrest-demonstration. This was the breeding ground that gave rise to violent protest. During the protest movement of 2011, anti-monarchists were openly demanding something quite unthinkable in the Gulf: the fall of the royal family.

How did the Arab spring emerge in Bahrain?
Claire Beaugrand: It wasn’t the parliamentary opposition who called for the first demonstration. It was a Facebook page called “Youth of the Revolution of February 14” with a slogan calling for a radical regime change. What is amazing is that when the call of February 14 came, that radical fringe crystallized all the resentment of far more moderate people who formed the main body of Wifaq. Everyone got behind their agenda. The slogans were very heterogeneous, ranging from “Neither Shia nor Sunni, but Bahraini” to “The people want regime reform” or “The people want the regime to fall.” After the first deaths among the protesters, the regime sought to negotiate: the King instructed the Crown Prince, who is seen as a reformist in the royal family, to negotiate with the opposition, but the dialogue failed. And on March 14, 2011, the troops of the Peninsula Shield (the Gulf Cooperation Council) entered the country to protect its strategic installations and a state of emergency was declared.

Where is the protest today?
Claire Beaugrand: It continues and shows no signs of weakening, in either its peaceful or its violent form. Wifaq’s calls to demonstrate always mobilize crowds of more than 10,000 people. In Shiite villages, gangs of youths clash with police every day, throwing Molotov cocktails which are met with tear gas in return.

People are still very traumatized by the repression of February-March 2011 – which was the subject of an investigation by the independent commission led by Professor Bassiouni, which criticised the excessive use of force and the recourse to torture and which established the number of victims at 35 – and by the sectarian violence that followed.

At present, the feeling is that the situation cannot continue and must return to normal: the street violence continues between the young revolutionaries and the police, which recently resulted in the loss of human lives. The opposition continues to highlight cases of torture, the political atmosphere is tense and the government, furious at the international attention being paid to the deepening crisis, is growing impatient faced with the pronouncements of activists who have remained completely impervious to its implementation of the recommendations of the Commission Bassiouni.

Everyone agrees that there is no alternative to negotiation. However, since the beginning of 2012, the dialogue that both sides proclaimed and expressed hope for has not taken place, with each side blaming the other for this failure.

Interview by Nora Bensaâdoune
 

BIOGRAPHY
Claire Beaugrand is a political analyst for the Gulf states at the International Crisis Group. She graduated with a PhD from the London School of Economics in 2011.

LINK
Detailed report from Human Rights Watch on the events of 2011 in Bahrain

The Syrian crisis is spreading in the Lebanon. Last night, in the suburb south of Beirut, there were violent clashes between pro and anti-Assad supporters, with 2 killed and twenty injured.  The day before, two prominent Sunni religious dignitaries, one being Sheikh Abdel Wahed, both firmly opposed to the Syrian regime, were  assassinated at an army checkpoint in the north of the country, which sparked things off. For several years, Lebanon has been facing latent conflict as the  Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement  and certain pro-Assad Sunnis in power support the Syrian regime.  The majority of Lebanese Sunnis however  support the cause of the Syrian revolutionaries, who are for the most part Sunni.

What is the atmosphere like in the Lebanon after the street fighting between opponents and supporters of Assad in Beirut which left two dead last night?

Wissam Charaf, ARTE Journal correspondent in the Lebanon: ”Calm has returned to Beirut. The  town is relatively calm, people are going about their business. Only the shops in the roads close to the  Tarik el-Jdideh district, where the trouble took place last night, remain closed. But everyone is holding their breath. It’s an hour from the burial of Sheikh Abdel Wahed, who was killed at an army checkpoint. We don’t know if the protests will start up again tonight, after the burial.”

It isn’t the first time confrontations of this type have broken out  beyond Syria’s borders. Last week, there was fighting between pro and anti-Assad supporters in Tripoli. Does this mean the Syrian conflict will definitively extend into the Lebanon?

Wissam Charaf: ”Lebanon undoubtedly mirrors what happens in Syria. It reflects the Syrian divisions in the conflict between Sunnis who oppose the Syrian regime and Shiites, who support the Syrian regime through Hezbollah.  Tensions are increasing. Last week, a Sunni militant was arrested in the centre of Tripoli, a Sunni stronghold,  by  a group affiliated to Hezbollah, indirectly pro-Syrian. So incidents are increasing. The main fear is that it will lead to an explosion of violence, as was the case in May 2008.”

In the Lebanon,  the majority of Sunnis support the revolution in Syria, a country which has long dominated the Lebanon. What are the consequences for the interdenominational divisions in the  Lebanon?

Wissam Charaf : ”The problem is that Lebanon has always been the preferred place for others’ battles. The Lebanese are now paying the price for the divisions in Syria. They are mirrored  in the divisions between pro and anti-Syrians in the  Lebanon, namely Sunni and Shiite movements. The problem is that the confrontations like those of 8 March and 14 March are no longer between political groups, as was the case for several years. Today, we talk about Sunni and Shiite. Therein lies the inter-Muslim conflict, which could  tear the Lebanon apart for several years.”
 
Violent clashes broke out after the death of Sheikh Abdel Wahed. Is further confrontation likely?

Wissam Charaf: ”At the moment,  everyone is holding their breath. We don’t know what the reaction will be. Will there be another demonstration of force by Sunnis? The main problem today is the army.  The army is traditionally neutral. Now the Sheikh, a Sunni, was killed at an army checkpoint. Today, the message received by the Sunnis is that the Lebanese army, traditionally neutral, has killed one of their own. In this context,  can the army continue its role as buffer between the different factions?  If it loses this role, there will be no safety net between the two factions who are heavily armed.”

How have people reacted?

Wissam Charaf: ”The atmosphere in Beirut is electric. Several schools are closed. People have been frightened by the night’s violence. It reminds them of the worst days of the civil war. This afternoon, a rally will take place in Martyrs Square against a return to civil and inter-religious war. On the eve of summer, the tourist season when the Lebanese can earn some money, people do not view these confrontations favourably.”

Rebecca Donauer for ARTE Journal: What different groups make up the Syrian opposition?

There is no single Syrian opposition. There are different opposition groups in Turkey, in France, in Great Britain and of course inside Syria. The predominant block is the Syrian National Council based in Istanbul. The Council is a collection of different individuals and intellectuals, and relatively little is known about the level of support they enjoy among the Syrian population. The fact that the Council supports the Free Syrian Army has been very well received inside Syria itself, but the opposition is anything but united. It has a convoluted structure and is probably a temporary phenomenon. If things in Syria calm down, then the Muslim Brotherhood is once again most likely to emerge from the struggle with Bashar al-Assad as the strongest political force in Syria.
 
Why is the opposition so convoluted?

It’s been impossible for the political opposition in Syria to organise itself for the last 40 years. Organisation has only been possible abroad. Every attempt to organise opposition inside Syria has been repressed. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Syria’s population is made up of ethnic-religious blocks. In a state like this, it’s natural that group identities also heavily influence the political conduct of the members of the various groups. To put it plainly, a Druze is not going to eagerly support a Christian political party any more than a Christian is going to be enthusiastic about supporting a Sunni party. This of course weakens the opposition, which has been comprised up to now of an assortment of different people, many of great moral integrity, who genuinely want to achieve a democratic transformation in Syria but who are simply starved of the possibilities for achieving this.

There have been recent reports of human rights abuses by the opposition…

The Free Syrian Army is absolutely prepared to report on its own Facebook profile of violence against soldiers in very graphic language. They talk about the complete destruction of the enemy or of having slit the throats of government soldiers. So the Free Syrian Army is not driven solely by noble motives. Fundamentally, it should be said that what we’ve seen in Syria in the last few months, an uprising of parts of the population against the government, the regime, is now being overshadowed by foreign interventions. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states are increasingly involving themselves in Syria’s internal politics. In particular, they finance the Free Syrian Army, pay the soldiers’ wages and deliver weapons through Turkey, Iraq or Lebanon. At the same time, the USA is becoming louder in signalling that it can imagine intervening in Syria. This means that in the end Syria’s future won’t be decided on the basis of what the Syrians themselves want. Instead, it will come down to what the outside forces that are exerting more and more influence on the opposition decide is the right path.

Intelligence services report that al-Qaeda is infiltrating the Syrian opposition…

To say infiltrating is surely an exaggeration. But it’s obvious that anywhere the order in a country breaks down and an opposition forms, radical Islamists are also going to be a part of the mix. It’s impossible to seriously assess whether they are really linked to al-Qaeda or not. But there are sure to be radical Islamist forces involved using the instability for their own ends.

Burhan Ghalioun, head of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the leading opposition force, has called on the people to demonstrate. He wants to enforce another essential point in Kofi Annan’s plan which, in addition to the withdrawal of tanks and the ceasefire, stipulates the right to peaceful demonstration. He has agreed to be interviewed for ARTE Journal.

Iris Hartl for ARTE Journal : Have you had confirmation of a fatality today, as reported by the media?

I haven’t had confirmation personally, but it was reported by militants on the ground. It’s most probably true. No-one trusts a regime that has used force for 13 months to deny people the right to peaceful expression.

This morning, you are calling on the Syrian people to protest on mass. Doesn’t the peace plan prohibit the opposition from carry on its demonstrations?

The aim of the ceasefire is to allow the Syrian people to protest peacefully. The Annan plan is not about preventing the Syrian people from expressing their desire for change. On the contrary, its purpose is to guarantee the Syrian people’s peaceful struggle for democracy. The goal of the overall Annan plan is the transition to a democratic country through means of negotiation. And the way to lead this negotiation is to allow the Syrian people freedom of expression. That’s why we’ve talked about the necessity of allowing the media entry into Syria. Conditions have to be provided so that they can work freely. That’s why the Syrian National Council has declared its opposition to the use of weapons. So that people can say what they think, what they want.

Assad’s regime has also set some conditions: the Syrian Foreign Affairs minister declared yesterday that Damascus reserved the right to respond to any attack by “armed terrorist groups against civilians, government forces and state or private property”. Is this a way of clearing their name and making the opposition responsible in case of failure?

Everyone knows there are no terrorist groups in the country. The people are terrorised by the heavy weapons and the armed forces under the command of the Syrian intelligence services and the government. They are firing on the people. They must stop. They must cease fire. Some of the revolutionaries no doubt are armed, especially the deserters from the army who refused to obey the order to kill citizens. The deserters (editor’s note: the Free Syrian Army) are not at war, not at all. They are just defending themselves against attack by the security forces. And so if there are no attacks by government forces, there will be no use of arms by the other side, the revolutionaries. Whatever happens, regarding fatalities, the regime is responsible. It’s the case today, as it was before.

The UN-Arab League envoy, Kofi Annan, anticipates in the first steps of his peace plan that a dialogue will be established between the government and the various opposition groups. Do you think that’s possible?

It will be possible if the government actually respects its commitments and withdraws the army from the towns as agreed in the peace plan. There can be no compromise on that issue. It’s the same for the security forces who are carrying out the repression. You can’t replace the army with police forces who kill and assassinate in secret and who arrest young people to prevent them from demonstrating for change. Also, as stated in the peace plan, the international humanitarian organisations must be allowed to do their work to help the stricken Syrian people cope with the difficult situation they face today. And the international community must provide guarantees that the government won’t go back on its word in the future, when things prove difficult. On that point, there are still no guarantees. Who will guarantee that tomorrow the ceasefire will hold and the weapons will be withdrawn from the streets? Who will guarantee that tomorrow the same criminal, the president, won’t give the order to these people to fire on the population? There is no guarantee.

What’s the solution? What can the international community do to obtain such guarantees?

It must provide guarantees, tell Assad that if he doesn’t accept change through peaceful means, there won’t be any other alternatives. All the parties must now agree to start negotiations to transfer power to an elected government which will truly represent the people. If the government uses indirect means to stop people expressing their wishes, the international community must threaten to intervene in a different way to help the people obtain their basic rights.

Is the opposition ready to accept the Syrian president Bachar al-Assad staying in power, in the short term, for the sake of peace, as anticipated in the Annan plan?
It’s the course of history, the course of the revolution, even the course of the Annan plan. Annan says the goal of the peace plan is to lead the country to democratic government.

Let’s talk about the Syrian opposition, which is still very divided. Do you think it can speak with one voice to be effective on a diplomatic level?

No opposition in the world is unified within a coalition. And the Syrian opposition, in such a situation, is truly unified, as regards the political programme. Everyone wants an end to the regime and the installation of a democratic government in its place. The Syrian opposition shares the same vision, as do the Syrian people. Nothing is stopping the opposition reaching agreement on a single form of organisation. However, it needs coordination, and that is happening. Within the Syrian National Council, a restructuring is underway so that all the elements of the opposition that are on the same political line can be integrated.

At the start of the revolt you were against arming the opposition. What is your position now?

There is no guarantee that the government and those who ordered the slaughter will respect their commitments. We need a force to protect the population and guarantee the right of the Syrian people to be protected from criminals. I think that’s normal. We haven’t asked the government to disarm, even though it has made a policy of killing and massacres in Syria. So, we can’t ask the opposition to completely disarm while there are no guarantees from the other camp.

Journalist and author Antoine Glaser has written extensively about Africa and was the Chief Editor of the French semi-monthly magazine on African politics, “Lettre du Continent”, for some 30 years. Barbara Lohr spoke with Glaser.

Barbara Lohr for ARTE Journal – The Tuareg rebels captured Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu within three days. What’s behind the hasty retreat of the Malian army?

Mali is a country that’s always been very difficult to govern, because it’s always been under the influence of Libya on the one hand and Algeria on the other. The fall of Colonel Gaddafi triggered a shockwave in the region, the scope of which was completely underestimated. Hundreds of Malians were members of Gaddafi’s army. After his fall they returned to northern Mali armed with heavy weaponry. Most of them are Tuaregs who prospered under Gaddafi. The Malian army was completely overwhelmed by the returning Tuareg troops, both in terms of firepower and manpower. They suddenly found themselves facing battle-hardened troops who, on top of everything, come from the same culture [the northern Malians (Editorial note)] and speak the same language. Neither the overthrown head-of-state Amadou Toumani Touré nor the ruling military junta had the capability to retake the north of the country, especially since the most important Tuareg chiefs, who were previously members of the army, had deserted.

You just said that the Tuaregs who returned from Libya came back well-armed. Is their arsenal unusual for this region?

They were already very well-armed. Former President Amadou Toumani Touré accused NATO and the allied French-British force of neglecting this threat and allowing the heavily armed Tuareg troops to withdraw back toward Mali and Niger. It’s not certain whether they have surface-to-air missiles, but their equipment is very good in any case. For years Libya was also practically a Russian weapons depot. Mali is a genuine democracy, but it’s also an extremely unstable state with no natural resources or sources of income. And all of its heads of state, above all Alpha Konaré and Amadou Toumani Touré, have always governed the country with the financial support of Libya and the protection of another powerful partner, Algeria, which has suddenly gone oddly mute on the situation there. As such, Mali has always been subject to this two-pronged influence.

There is a lot of talk at the moment about the Tuareg rebels belonging to the MNLA liberation movement, but the Islamist Ansar Dine movement also has a presence in the region. What is the connection between these two movements?

That’s very hard to say. First you’ve got the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and the Tuareg people cite Azawad as the region of the Sahara that they inhabit, that they conquered in its entirety. This includes the former Tuareg capital city of Timbuktu, an Islamic centre since the 15th century. But the MNLA movement has a secular worldview, while Ansar Dine wants to introduce Sharia law. It’s extremely hard to determine the balance of power between the two movements. The Ansar Dine troops are probably less well-equipped, but they have a great deal of combat experience. Even the relationship between Ansar Dine and the few hundred Al-Qaida jihadists in the Maghreb region is hard to unravel. The Al-Qaida fighters are Algerian and Mauritanian. The situation is very complex, but I don’t think the MNLA wants to advance all the way into the capital city of Bamako. They’ll be satisfied with the liberation of Azawad, and the movement will most likely concentrate on administering this region with its three large cities. On the other hand, we don’t know whether Ansar Dine wants to advance on Bamako, perhaps with the assistance of the Maghreb region’s Al-Qaida troops. But regardless, the country has already spun completely out of control, and like I said, the international community completely underestimated this threat. It’s true that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has mobilised 2,000 soldiers, but the country is twice the size of France. Even the area that the Tuareg have conquered is larger than France. Under these circumstances, 2,000 troops and a couple of helicopters won’t be sufficient for battling the types of movements that are at home there.

Do you think the country is going to split apart?

Unfortunately, the country’s split is already a done deal. The Malian army is disintegrating. Its Tuareg soldiers have deserted, and the army’s cohesion was always fragile anyway. The coup in Mali even began with a mutiny among the army’s officers. So the division of the country is a reality, and the neighbouring countries of Ivory Coast, Niger and Burkina Faso are already afraid that the conflict will spread throughout the entire Sahel region. They fear the region could become a kind of “grey zone”, since the Tuareg people are spread over parts of Algeria, Burkina Faso and Niger. Subsequently, there’s a threat of regional destabilisation in a region where many villages have depended on tourism up to now. If the tourists stay home and aid organisations also leave the country, the region will fall into a complete economic and social tailspin.

In addition to the Tuaregs, other armed groups fighting for different objectives also inhabit the region. Is there a fear that in the long-term, it will again be the civilian population that suffers the most as a result of this conflict?

Hundreds of thousands of Malians, all the non-Tuaregs, have already fled the north of the country. These refugees are certain to destabilise neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso, Niger and even Mauretania. When that happens, the entire region is in danger of economic and social chaos and a humanitarian catastrophe, and not just in northern Mali.

What kind of leeway does the military junta still have?

Let’s not forget that the junta started with a mutiny of non-commissioned officers who searched in vain for days to find a higher ranking officer to assume command. So this rebel movement was sparked within the officer’s corps, which was fed up with the General Staff and all the thoroughly corrupt generals. On top of this, the officers complained of a lack of equipment and other materials-related problems. Many soldiers were abandoned to their fate, particularly in Kidal and then later on in Gao. Elections are actually scheduled in Mali for 29 April, but even though the junta has announced the reinstatement of the constitution, the overall impression is that the democratic process has lost its priority status in light of the complete disintegration of the country due to the advance of the Tuareg forces and the rebel movements in the north. ECOWAS is likely to request outside help, primarily from the UN. But the geopolitical circumstances in the region are very difficult, particularly because Algeria has always rejected the presence of French or American military advisors in the past. The entire situation is no walk in the park.

Manuel Dantas for ARTE Journal – You had gone there to prepare a series of reports on the situation in Homs, a city which you already visited last October. What was your reporting experience like?

Shortly after the beginning of the Syrian army’s offensive on Homs, I made an unauthorised visit to Syria for the second time to reach the city. But this time round, I couldn’t. Every day, I would go gather news from networks close to the revolution, who were taking care of different people- these are very subdivided and complex networks- and I would ask them if today was the day we could attempt to enter the city. And every day, they would say: “No, it’s not possible. The army is blocking everything, the roads and the shortcuts that we normally use to get our supplies, to transport the wounded, our fighters, food supplies, weapons or satellite communication equipment. In other words, to transport everything that is banned and that needs to be transported without the knowledge of the regime. All our roads have been blocked, we can’t get to Homs”. I spent eight days in a city which is approximately half way between the Lebanese border and Homs, and by the end of these eight days, I gave up and headed back…because the security conditions were bad, because I didn’t want to put people at an unduly high risk by twisting their arms when they were saying that it was impossible.

Since the beginning of the offensive, has the city of Homs been entirely isolated?

The roads between Homs and the Lebanese border have been largely blocked as Mary Colvin, who just passed away, went through the same network and the same border crossing point as I did, she managed to get to Homs shortly after me. After I turned back, some roads were reopened. But, generally speaking, the roads are blocked.

What are the living conditions like of the people who live in the outskirts of Homs, where you were?

Fighting has entirely become part of people’s lives. The fighting is not limited to Homs and that’s the first thing that I realised when I crossed the border. All the Sunni-populated and pro-revolution areas are under army fire, beaten down, surrounded by the army and subjected to a level of violence that I had not expected to see in Homs, but which I also saw in other cities. The population in all the areas is living in war conditions with an immediate risk associated with war, in addition to all the problems of everyday life. The city where I was had been liberated two months prior to my arrival, and for two months electricity had been cut and mobile telephone networks had also largely been cut. So they were living in complete isolation, unable to recharge their batteries but for some generators here and there, and having to rely on smugglers to bring them fuel by circumventing army checkpoints. The material conditions are therefore becoming extremely difficult for everyone, especially in the pro-revolution areas. There is a very clear collective punishment strategy on the part of the regime against these areas, which is not only military, but also humanitarian, with the clear objective, in any case, of causing a humanitarian crisis.    

What role does the Free Syrian Army play in this revolution, how is it operating, what is its strategy?

The Free Syrian Army (FSA) has greatly developed in the recent months, but it still finds itself in a fundamentally asymmetrical situation. As a matter of fact, this makes me think of the Iraqi insurgency against the American army, all things relative, because the al-Assad army is nowhere near the level of the American army, but the situation in the field is very similar. The Free Syrian Army is underequipped; it’s punching above its weight from a purely military standpoint, and must therefore fall back on a strategy of harassment and guerrilla warfare against this regular army, which has control over the largest portion of the land, at least over the major routes. The major routes are under regime control, and the shortcuts are, where possible, generally under the control of revolutionaries in the Sunni areas, except recently around Homs. There is also a major difference in the field between the situations in Libya and Syria. In Libya, you had the Cyrenaic pocket, which was pro-revolution, and you had the Tripoli pocket, which was a regime stronghold, and between the two, a frontline. When you move around Syria, in the mountains, you go from a Sunni village, which is supposedly pro-revolution, to a Druze village, to a Christian village and then to an Alawite village. And even in the cities, you go from an Alawite neighbourhood to a Christian neighbourhood and then to a Sunni neighbourhood. The Syrian territory looks like it has been covered in confetti, each confetti being the living area of a community. The FSA strategy is therefore not a Libya-like wave strategy, but rather a strategy which consists in holding pockets and expanding them. The FSA is conducting a ripple-effect strategy to expand and connect these small pro-revolution pockets of resistance to each other. All this is happening in a context that resembles civil war, because I could see that community tensions were extremely high.

The Syrian society consists of various communities who are affected in different ways by current events. A civil war is looming, which forces are involved?

Overall, there is community determinism. This has been the great tragedy in the Middle East for the past ten years. It is the very spread of this sectarianism which is the determining factor for political choices, depending on which community you belong to. In other words, Alawites therefore support the regime, as does a large portion of Christians. Because the regime threatens them with the possibility of  an Islamist revolution, which is in actual fact not true. These revolutionaries are generally less Islamist than those that I saw in Libya or Egypt. And, in any case, the regime has, for the longest time, set the scene for a real ethnic showdown. Thirty years ago, it cracked down on the city of Hama. And Hafez-al-Assad, Bashar’s father, had sent Christian generals to head units which crushed the city. It was a way of tying Christians’ hands and sealing their fate with the regime, through a blood pact, by saying to Christians: “if one day the Sunnis come to power, they will crush you, they will seek revenge”. However, having said that, sectarianism is not absolute. I came across pro-revolution Alawites and Christians. But they are particularly discreet, because when they are caught, they are particularly badly treated as the regime sees them as traitors. On the contrary, the Sunni bourgeoisie, namely from Damascus and Aleppo, is still very weary of the revolution, because much of its economic interest depends on the regime, so it really fears a change in regime.

President Bashar al-Assad has opted for the path of escalation and had part of the Syrian people massacred in order to stay in power. Can he win his gamble without his country slipping into chaos?

The regime is doomed, but there are still many resources available. This may therefore still last another 6 months to a year. The problem is that the civil war has practically already broken out, and even a prospective fall of the regime is not very likely to impede this civil war race. A saying that I like very much is: “Geography placed Syria between Lebanon and Iraq, and History will give it back its rightful place”. The Syrian civil war, at its outset, has similar traits to the Lebanese war, namely due to interaction between communities, but also due to regional interventions. The different countries within the region all have a stake in this situation. And, this war also resembles the Iraqi civil war, namely through its extreme sectarianism and some of its practices, sectarian kidnappings and killings.